Response to WG last call, Problem Statement: Thoughts on the IETF problem statement

[Romascanu, Dan (Dan)]

> What mechanism do IEEE and other cheap SDOs have from preventing, say,
> Cisco or Microsoft from registering thousands of voting members to
> control a given working group? They certainly have the resources
> required. What protects minority in a voting-based SDO? Some kind of
> count-based (rather than portion-based) appeal process?
> 
> 

Two examples from my IEEE experience:

- At the beginning of a standards activity, a Call For Interest (CFI) is being hold. This is roughly the equivalent of an IETF BOF. Care is being taken that there is an appropriate balance of participants from the research/academy, vendors, and customers, counted on organizational rather than individuals basis before a decision is taken to start a standards work
- Later, in the editing process, comments are classified as critical (REQUIRED) or not. All critical comments, from any individual need to be resolved, and have quasi-veto power. Certainly, at the end of the day there is enough power for the majority to vote down with a 75% majority repeated comments coming from one single individual, but I am not sure that this is worse than the IETF process of consensus reaching in a Last Call. I am not sure that majority votes requiring 75% majority is worse in this case than the decision taken by one single WG chair (who is also sponsored by some company, isn't he/she?)

Regards,

Dan