IDN processing-related security considerations for draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec

[=JeffH]

Hi,

In working towards completion of..

   HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
   <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec>

..and..

   The Web Origin Concept
   https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-origin

..we are attempting to address the proper way to reference IDNA2008 and 
IDNA2003 in terms of stipulating comparisons of domain names (that may or may 
not be IDNs).

In discussions with our ADs and a few IDNA-literate folks, we've been informed 
that the IDNA-specific language in the recently-released RFC6265 HTTP State 
Management spec isn't quite up to the standards they would like to see at this 
time.

Thus I've performed some surgery on draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec and 
have included below the specific section portions that are IDNA specific (this 
is from my working copy which isn't quite yet overall ready tonight to submit 
as -03).

The key context to keep in mind when reviewing the below is that the key 
"processing" -- essentially a domain name comparison -- will occur deep within 
the bowels of HTTP clients, well along the processing pipeline for URIs, and 
presumably after IDNA-canonicalization and requisite validation/testing has 
occurred. However, the guidance we've received is that given the complexities 
and subtleties of IDNA processing and considerations, our specs really should 
be more explicit about the foregoing assumption(s) and the downside risks if 
the requisite validation/testing is not performed.

With that context in mind, thoughts on the below are solicited. Apologies for 
just having these excerpts at this time, but I ought to have 
-websec-strict-transport-sec-03 submitted in the next few days at most.

thanks,

=JeffH
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7.  User Agent Processing Model

    This section describes the HTTP Strict Transport Security processing
    model for UAs.  There are several facets to the model, enumerated by
    the following subsections.

    This processing model assumes that the UA implements IDNA2008
    [RFC5890], or possibly IDNA2003 [RFC3490], as noted in Section 11
    "Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Dependency
    and Migration".  It also assumes that all domain names manipulated in
    this specification's context are already IDNA-canonicalized as
    outlined in Section 8 "Domain Name IDNA-Canonicalization" prior to
    the processing specified in this section.

    The above assumptions mean that this processing model also
    specifically assumes that appropriate IDNA and Unicode validations
    and character list testing have occured on the domain names, in
    conjunction with their IDNA-canonicalization, prior to the processing
    specified in this section.  See the IDNA-specific security
    considerations in Section 13.2 "Internationalized Domain Names" for
    rationale and further details.
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8.  Domain Name IDNA-Canonicalization

    An IDNA-canonicalized domain name is the string generated by the
    following algorithm, whose input must be a valid Unicode-encoded (in
    NFC form [Unicode6]) string-serialized domain name:

    1.  Convert the domain name to a sequence of individual domain name
        label strings.

    2.  When implementing IDNA2008, convert each label that is not a Non-
        Reserved LDH (NR-LDH) label, to an A-label.  See Section 2.3.2 of
        [RFC5890] for definitions of the former and latter, refer to
        Sections 5.3 through 5.5 of [RFC5891] for the conversion
        algorithm and requisite input validation and character list
        testing procedures.

        Otherwise, when implementing IDNA2003, convert each label using
        the "ToASCII" conversion in Section 4 of [RFC3490] (see also the
        definition of "equivalence of labels" in Section 2 of the latter
        specification).

    3.  Concatenate the resulting labels, separating each label from the
        next with (".") a %x2E character.

    See also Section 11 "Internationalized Domain Names for Applications
    (IDNA): Dependency and Migration" and Section 13.2 "Internationalized
    Domain Names" of this specification for further details and
    considerations.
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11.  Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Dependency
      and Migration

    Textual domain names on the modern Internet may contain one or more
    "internationalized" domain name labels.  Such domain names are
    referred to as "internationalized domain names" (IDNs).  The
    specification suites defining IDNs and the protocols for their use
    are named "Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA)".
    At this time, there are two such specification suites: IDNA2008
    [RFC5890] and its predecessor IDNA2003 [RFC3490].

    IDNA2008 obsoletes IDNA2003, but there are differences between the
    two specifications, and thus there can be differences in processing
    (e.g. converting) domain name labels that have been registered under
    one from those registered under the other.  There will be a
    transition period of some time during which IDNA2003-based domain
    name labels will exist in the wild.  User agents SHOULD implement
    IDNA2008 [RFC5890] and MAY implement [RFC5895] (see also Section 7 of
    [RFC5894]) or [UTS46] in order to facilitate their IDNA transition.
    If a user agent does not implement IDNA2008, the user agent MUST
    implement IDNA2003.
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13.  Security Considerations
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13.2.  Internationalized Domain Names

    Internet security relies in part on the DNS and the domain names it
    hosts.  Domain names are used by users to identify and connect to
    Internet hosts and other network resources.  For example, Internet
    security is compromised if a user entering an internationalized
    domain name (IDN) is connected to different hosts based on different
    interpretations of the IDN.

    The processing models specified in this specification assume that the
    domain names they manipulate are IDNA-canonicalized, and that the
    canonicalization process correctly performed all appropriate IDNA and
    Unicode validations and character list testing per the requisite
    specifications (e.g., as noted in Section 8 "Domain Name IDNA-
    Canonicalization").  These steps are necessary in order to avoid
    various potentially compromising situations.

    In brief, some examples of issues that could stem from lack of
    careful and consistent Unicode and IDNA validations are things such
    as unexpected processing exceptions, truncation errors, and buffer
    overflows, as well as false-positive and/or false-negative domain
    name matching results.  Any of the foregoing issues could possibly be
    leveraged by attackers in various ways.

    Additionally, IDNA2008 [RFC5890] differs from IDNA2003 [RFC3490] in
    terms of disallowed characters and character mapping conventions.
    This situation can also lead to false-positive and/or false-negative
    domain name matching results, resulting in, for example, users
    possibly communicating with unintended hosts, or not being able to
    reach intended hosts.

    For details, refer to the Security Considerations sections of
    [RFC5890], [RFC5891], and [RFC3490], as well as the specifications
    they normatively reference.  Additionally, [RFC5894] provides
    detailed background and rationale for IDNA2008 in particular, as well
    as IDNA and its issues in general, and should be consulted in
    conjunction with the former specifications.

13.3.  Denial of Service (DoS)
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