Browser IDN display policy: opinions sought

Simon Josefsson simon at josefsson.org
Wed Dec 14 11:05:14 CET 2011


Mark Davis ☕ <mark at macchiato.com> writes:

> That says to me that much it would be better to always show the Unicode
> characters (thus giving a uniform UI across browsers),

+1 to that, and thanks for saying it.

I don't think it is constructive to frame a discussion like 'chose
between A, B and C but do not think about the general problem and
propose any other solution that might be better because we don't want to
hear about it'.

> but then provide a more obvious UI signal to users that the page is
> suspect (and for what reason).  So from your example, the user should
> see http://www.viagénie.com<http://www.xn--viagnie-eya.com/> and
> http://биатлон.рф <http://xn--80abvnkf0a.xn--p1ai/> in all of the
> browsers.

Exactly.

There is a market for software that protects against "dangerous"
website.  Phishing is a technological problem that goes far beyond IDNs.
I suggest we let experts in that area handle that problem, and let us
focus on displaying IDNs to users.

As an analogy, consider if we took a similar approach to MIME
attachments.  The way some browsers implement IDNs today is similar to
letting e-mail clients display the raw MIME encoding of the entire
e-mail to the user when the client didn't have the attachment in a
whitelist.

/Simon


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