Mixing scripts (Re: Unicode versions (Re: Criteria forexceptional characters))

Martin Duerst duerst at it.aoyama.ac.jp
Sun Dec 24 06:37:24 CET 2006


Hello Michel,

This is a very interesting list. However, the fact that
Arabic and Hebrew are listed here may be confusing for
many people. In terms of spoofing on the character level,
the list is correct that the spoofing potential between
Ascii and Arabic or Hebrew is very low (make sure to use
a font that lets the user distinguish Arabic Alif and
l/I/1, though). However, mixing Ascii and Arabic or Hebrew
is disallowed both in IDNs and in IRIs to avoid bidi
problems.

So the fact that the list says that IE7 permits mixing
these scripts means that either IE7 is not correctly
implementing IDNA/IRIs, or the list is wrong. I hope
it's the later, and it can be clarified.

Regards,     Martin. 

At 19:31 06/12/22, Michel Suignard wrote:
>Probably another piece of info in the debate:
>http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/2006/07/31/684337.aspx 
>It shows what IE7 does on the UI side. This rule relaxing on script
>mixing was to allow ASCII to be mixed with scripts where confusability
>risk is low. This was done among other to allow Japanese to be mixed
>with ASCII which is a common practice in Japan and quite a few other
>writing system where ASCII can't be easily confused with native
>characters but is also commonly mixed in brand names.
>This is by no mean an endorsement of what should be done at the protocol
>level. The list of 'allowed scripts' can be useful input for the ongoing
>discussion.
>
>Michel 
>
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#-#-#  Martin J. Du"rst, Assoc. Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
#-#-#  http://www.sw.it.aoyama.ac.jp       mailto:duerst at it.aoyama.ac.jp     



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