Document: draft-ietf-mobileip-lowlatency-handoffs-v4-10  
Reviewer: Lakshminath Dondeti [ldondeti@qualcomm.com]
Review Date:  Thursday 8/18/2005 3:04 AM CST  
Telechat Date:  Thursday 8/18/2005

Summary: Generally ready for publication, but the following 
clarifications/corrections would be helpful

Review:  
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Please consider the following comments and revise the text perhaps 
during RFC Editor processes.

* Proxy Router Solicitation is abbreviated as ProxyRtSol in some places 
(e.g., Figure 1) and as PrRtSol (e.g., in the last paragraph of Page 
14).  Please revise to be consistent.  ProxyRtAdv and PrRtAdv is another 
similar inconsistent abbreviation.

* In several places, there is some roundabout text about identifiers and IP 
addresses.  Please use the general term, identifier and followup with 
examples of identifiers (e.g., IP address, L2 identifier).  The text is 
there, but the specification starts out with a MUST on IP address and then 
goes on to allow other identifiers.  A revision would help clarify things.

* Section 3.4, 2nd paragraph has a sentence that says "... MUST be 
authenticated to prevent attacks."  Perhaps add "impersonation" before attacks.

Notes on Security Considerations section:

This section looks good in some places, but could use a few sentences 
elsewhere.  For instance, toward the end of the first paragraph there is a 
sentence that says "The absence of this security would allow ..."  A few 
more of those would be great, say after the second sentence of the second 
paragraph ("In the event that the MN does not ... it MAY drop them 
").  What is the risk if the MN does not drop the packets?  It may be 
obvious to the editor/authors, but not to all the readers.

Why is IKE being specified as the key management protocol, and not 
IKEv2?  Perhaps that has to do with Mobile IPv4 history?

Please add -96 to HMAC-SHA1 as in Ref[12].

The second paragraph of Page 48 says that "all FAs involved in low latency 
handoff MUST support manual pre-configuration of security associations with 
neighboring FAs."  Please clarify that the SAs must be peer-to-peer.

That paragraph also says "involving shared keys."  I am wondering if that 
means whether manually configured IPsec SAs or IKE/IKEv2 with  PSKs is the 
minimal requirement.  Please clarify.

The third paragraph of Page 48 says "some level of L2 security is 
assumed."  There is a good amount of qualifying text follows that 
statement, but also contains sentences such as "adequate security."  Would 
it be fair to say that integrity and replay protection are 
required.  (based on the impersonation threat and also the threat of 
impersonation leading to resource consumption -- integrity protection alone 
might not be sufficient as an adversary may be able to replay old requests 
to cause resource consumption).