Browser IDN display policy: opinions sought
vint at google.com
Mon Dec 12 08:38:15 CET 2011
as ugly as it might be, I wonder whether showing both UNICODE and
PUNYCODE expressions would be useful? By itself, this might not reveal
a spoof unless one had bookmarked domain names against which to
compare, of course. If the viewer does not have an appropriate
font/script, of course, then only the PUNYCODE is displayable to any
useful effect. Again, one would need reference points to detect a
On Mon, Dec 12, 2011 at 1:54 AM, "Martin J. Dürst"
<duerst at it.aoyama.ac.jp> wrote:
> On 2011/12/12 5:12, John C Klensin wrote:
>> It also raises a very complex problem from which none of these
>> strategies are immune (unless they are completely focused on
>> user experience without even a hint of protecting people from
>> harm). What we know already is that script-mixing tests aren't
>> much good. Yes, preventing them (preferably as a registration
>> norm) unless they are actually necessary, is a good thing to do.
>> But, if someone is actually planning an attack, there are more
>> than enough "all in one script but confusable with another"
>> examples to provide ample opportunities.
> Yes indeed. The browser vendors overreacted on issues such as script-mixing,
> stuff that the user isn't able to read, and so on, because overreacting was
> easier than a more careful reaction, and they were able to say that they did
> But they didn't do much for in-script attacks, because that's much more
> difficult. (Not that I'm advocating a browser that shows MlCR0S0FT.com with
>> If we tell, or appear to tell, the poor lusers that we are
>> protecting them against a particular variety of attack --such as
>> confusing names-- and end up doing that often enough to be
>> persuasive that we are accomplishing something while remaining
>> open to slightly-more-clever attacks, we actually decrease
>> effective security by encouraging the user to become less wary.
> With regards to wrong messages, I'm not so concerned about the typical
> "luser", but about the people between the end users and the hard-core tech
> experts. I'm not so much concerned about the actual loss of money. People
> who are stupid enough to click before thinking will click before thinking,
> whatever the circumstances. The APWG and others will be busy to take down
> phishers as fast as they can independent of what we may or may not tell
> people. But I'm concerned about the wasted effort on implementations and the
> damage from suboptimal implementations (e.g. showing only a small part of
> what could be shown without any direct spam potential).
> Regards, Martin.
> Idna-update mailing list
> Idna-update at alvestrand.no
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