Return-Path: Received: from murder ([unix socket]) by eikenes.alvestrand.no (Cyrus v2.2.8-Mandrake-RPM-2.2.8-4.2.101mdk) with LMTPA; Wed, 17 Aug 2005 00:45:29 +0200 X-Sieve: CMU Sieve 2.2 Received: from localhost (eikenes.alvestrand.no [127.0.0.1]) by eikenes.alvestrand.no (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9431932009C for ; Wed, 17 Aug 2005 00:45:29 +0200 (CEST) Received: from eikenes.alvestrand.no ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (eikenes.alvestrand.no [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 20702-02 for ; Wed, 17 Aug 2005 00:45:24 +0200 (CEST) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.4.8 Received: from megatron.ietf.org (megatron.ietf.org [132.151.6.71]) by eikenes.alvestrand.no (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A38432009A for ; Wed, 17 Aug 2005 00:45:24 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([127.0.0.1] helo=megatron.ietf.org) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.32) id 1E5AAJ-00086b-Sv; Tue, 16 Aug 2005 18:44:15 -0400 Received: from odin.ietf.org ([132.151.1.176] helo=ietf.org) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.32) id 1E5AAH-00086S-Nc for ltru@megatron.ietf.org; Tue, 16 Aug 2005 18:44:13 -0400 Received: from ietf-mx.ietf.org (ietf-mx [132.151.6.1]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA17892 for ; Tue, 16 Aug 2005 18:44:10 -0400 (EDT) Received: from montage.altserver.com ([63.247.74.122]) by ietf-mx.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1E5Ajh-00013w-5T for ltru@ietf.org; Tue, 16 Aug 2005 19:20:50 -0400 Received: from ver78-2-82-241-91-24.fbx.proxad.net ([82.241.91.24] helo=jfc.afrac.org) by montage.altserver.com with esmtpa (Exim 4.44) id 1E5AAF-0004ML-2i for ltru@ietf.org; Tue, 16 Aug 2005 15:44:11 -0700 Message-Id: <6.2.1.2.2.20050817004329.0560c460@mail.afrac.org> X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.2.1.2 Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 00:44:07 +0200 To: ltru@ietf.org From: r&d afrac Subject: Re: [Ltru] Re: WGLC security considerations Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - montage.altserver.com X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - ietf.org X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - afrac.org X-Scan-Signature: 3e15cc4fdc61d7bce84032741d11c8e5 Cc: X-BeenThere: ltru@lists.ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: Language Tag Registry Update working group discussion list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: ltru-bounces@lists.ietf.org Errors-To: ltru-bounces@lists.ietf.org X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at alvestrand.no On 21:11 16/08/2005, Frank Ellermann said: >Jefsey Morfin wrote: > > I think the following text would be more appropriate: >[...] > >The shorter version addresses the main issue more precisely. > >Your longer proposal is too broad, it covers more than only >language tags, it's applicable to most kinds of information >exchange. > >Putting vague threats related to many kinds of communication >- not only language tags - in the "security considerations" >would be a bad idea. We were supposed to identify _specific_ >risks. not _general_ issues. Dear Frank, The specific risks due to the language tags are numerous. I will identify three of them: - risk of confusion as they introduce non network related information where network related information is needed. This risk is structural and may substantially delay the architectural development of the Internet due to its probable support by dominant actors. I doubt the authors will document it. This is the main risk I fight in opposing their Draft. - individual risks on content (filtering, censoring, etc.) and on persons (identification, privacy violation, etc.). This kind of risk is never absolute: it lies in its increase. There is a difference between sending an information on a post card and in a letter under envelope because opening all the envelopes costs time and money. Language tags greatly simplifies the intelligence gathering, filtering, spying, censoring ... and their errors. Not considering language tags in OPES context for example is big mistake. But the main issue is that the user cannot turn it down. (NB. This risks could have been greatly reduced through flexible "x-tags" and "0-" escape sequence. I have no doubt people will die and suffer because of the ABNF. Standardisation is also a risky activity.) - global risks. Let say the "9am-5pm" orientation of the Draft is well known and will be increasingly known. The irritation resulting from the limitations to cultural lifes and innovation all over the world this draft will lead to, and the probable impact on IANA and IETF image, may be a direct or indirect triggering factor in many nasty events to come (I am sure you do not need I dwell on that point). The chances of this risk have decreased. The ABNF rigidity against our Open Source/Standard proposition, the resulting delays in excluding us, the exposure of the commercial interests involved will most probably now lead the WSIS Internet Governance Forum to take over the issue. A related risk would be that all this would delay a serious Internet Multilingual Framework. This is a matter on which we now actively work. jfc _______________________________________________ Ltru mailing list Ltru@lists.ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ltru